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In this paper, we study a model of opinion dynamics in a social network in the presence increasing
interpersonal influence, i.e., increasing peer pressure. Each agent in the social network has a distinct
social stress function given by a weighted sum of internal and external behavioral pressures. We
assume a weighted average update rule and prove conditions under which a connected group of agents
converge to a fixed opinion distribution, and under which conditions the group reaches consensus. We
show that the update rule is a gradient descent and explain its transient and asymptotic convergence
properties. Through simulation, we study the rate of convergence on a scale-free network and then
validate the assumption of increasing peer pressure in a simple empirical model.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s,02.10.Ox,02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with DeGroot [1], opinion models have been
studied extensively (see e.g., [2–19]). In these models,
opinion is a dynamic state variable whose evolution in
some compact subset of Rn is governed by an autonomous
dynamical system. Using this formalism, opinion models
have been unified with flocking models (see e.g., [20, 21])
in [22]. Most recent work on opinion dynamics (and their
unification with flocking models) considers the interac-
tion of agents on a graph structure [16–19, 22]. When
considered on a lattice, these models are share charac-
teristics to continuous variations of Ising models [5].
Recent work [18, 19] considers the evolution of opin-
ion on a social network in which agents are resistant to
change because of an innate belief. In particular, [18, 19]
use a variant of the model in [2] and study this prob-
lem from a game-theoretic perspective by considering
the price of anarchy on the opinion formation process
on a connected graph. The existence of innate beliefs,
which are hidden but affect (publicly) presented opin-
ion, is supported in recent empirical work by Stephens-
Davidowitz et al. [23–25]. While the work in [18, 19]
introduces the concept of the stubborn agent, it does not
consider the effect of situationally variant peer-pressure
on agents’ opinions, though statically weighted user con-
nections are considered. Peer pressure in social networks
is well-documented. Adoption of trends [26, 27], pur-
chasing behaviors [28], beliefs and cultural norms [29],
privacy behaviors [30], bullying [31], and health behav-
iors [32–35] have all been linked to peer influence.
In this paper, we consider the problem of opinion dy-
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namics on a social network of agents with innate beliefs
in which peer-pressure is a dynamically changing quan-
tity, independent of the opinions themselves. This has
the mathematical effect of transforming the formerly au-
tonomous dynamical system into a non-autonomous dy-
namical system.
Our notion of persuasion and peer-pressure affecting
these dynamics is related to the psychology literature on
belief formation and social influence. In particular, we
draw inspiration from studies on periodicity in human
behavior, and social influence theories [36]. We follow
Friedkin’s foundational theory that strong ties are more
likely to affect users’ opinions and result in persuasion or
social influence. Underpinning our model is also the no-
tion of mimicking. Brewer and more recently Van Bareen
[37, 38] suggest that mimicking is used when individuals
feel out of a group and therefore will alter their behavior
(to a point [38]) to be more socially accepted.
The resulting model also accounts for agents with rel-
atively varying resistance to changing their innate be-
liefs. We use a recent result from functional analysis on
the composition of (distinct) contraction mappings along
with the Sherman-Morrison formula to show:
1. Under increasing peer-pressure, the dynamical sys-
tem converges.
2. If peer-pressure increases in an unbounded way,
consensus emerges a weighted average of the innate
beliefs of the individuals.
3. The opinion update process converges to a gradient
descent, with linear convergence rate
4. The hypothesis of increasing peer-pressure can be
supported with a live data set.
Work herein is complementary to (e.g.) [17–19] in that we
consider a dynamic (increasing) peer-pressure coefficient
with variable weights on initial belief. Additionally, we
analyze the convergence rate of the dynamical system to
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2the fixed point, while [18, 19] focus on the model from a
game-theoretic perspective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section II we present the basic model. In Section III
we prove convergence of the model and that increasing
peer pressure leads to consensus in any connected graph.
We discuss the convergence rate in Section IV by show-
ing the dynamical system is, effectively, gradient descent.
We briefly relate our work to the cost of anarchy work
from [18] in Section V. In Section VI, we validate the hy-
pothesis of increasing peer pressure by fitting our model
to a live data set. Conclusions and future directions are
presented in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MODEL
We model a network of agents, representing individu-
als in a social network in which each user communicates
with her friends/associates, but not necessarily the en-
tire network. Assume that the agents’ network is rep-
resented by a simple graph G = (V,E) where vertexes
V are agents and edges E are the social connections
(communications) between them. It is clear that dis-
connected sections of the graph are independent, so we
assume that G is connected. For the remainder of the
paper, let V = {1, 2, . . . n}, so E is a subset of the two-
element subsets of V . The state of Agent i at time k is
a continuous value x
(k)
i ∈ [0, 1] that represents disclosed
opinion on a bivalent topic (e.g., “I support gun control”
or “I like classical music”). Each agent has a constant
preference x+i ∈ [0, 1] representing her inherent position
on the topic. This may differ from the opinion disclosed
to the public. The value x+i represents inherent agent
bias. Further, Agent i is assigned a non-negative ver-
tex weight si and positive edge weights wij respectively
for (i, j) ∈ E. The weight si, termed stubbornness [17],
models the tendency of Agent i to maintain her (private)
position x+i in public. The edge weights wij represent
friendship affinity. The set of all disclosed opinions is de-
noted by the vector x(k) while the set of constant private
preferences is x+. For the remainder of this paper, we
refer to publicly disclosed opinions simply as opinions.
Agent i’s state is updated by minimizing its social
stress:
Ji
(
x
(k)
i ,x
(k−1), k
)
= si
(
x
(k)
i − x+i
)2
+ ρ(k)
n∑
j=1
wij
(
x
(k)
i − x(k−1)j
)2
(1)
Here ρ(k) is the peer-pressure coefficient. In the se-
quel, we assume ρ(k) is an increasing function of k. As
noted in [18], under these assumptions, the first or-
der necessary conditions are sufficient for minimizing
Ji(x
(k)
i ,x
(k−1), k). The optimal state for Agent i at time
k is then:
x
(k)
i =
six
+
i + ρ
(k)
∑n
j=1 wijx
(k−1)
j
si + ρ(k)di
, (2)
where di =
∑n
j=1 wij is the weighted degree of vertex i.
The implied update rule is simply a generalization of the
DeGroot model variation found in [2] and generalizes the
model in [18] by including the stubbornness coefficient
and an increasing peer-pressure term.
Let A be the n × n weighted adjacency matrix of G.
In addition, let D be the n × n matrix with di on the
diagonal and let S be the n × n matrix with si on the
diagonal. Using these terms, the recurrence in Eq. (2)
can be written as:
x(k) =
(
S+ ρ(k)D
)−1 (
Sx+ + ρ(k)Ax(k−1)
)
We say that the agents converge to consensus x¯ if there
is some N so that for all n > N , ‖x¯−x(n)‖ <  for some
small  > 0. This represents meaningful compromise on
the issue under consideration.
III. CONVERGENCE
In this section, we consider the update rule in Eq. (2)
as a sequence of contraction mappings each with its own
fixed point. We then show that all these fixed points
converge to a weighted average. The result rests on a
variation of the contraction mapping theorem from [39].
Lemma 1 (See Chapter 13 of [40]). If L = D − A is
the weighted graph Laplacian, then L has an eigenvalue
0 with multiplicity 1 and a corresponding eigenvector 1
where 1 is the vector of all 1’s.
Lemma 2. For any ρ(k) > 0,S+ ρ(k)L is invertible.
Proof. By definition, the graph Laplacian is a positive
semidefinite symmetric matrix. In addition, the only
eigenvector with eigenvalue 0 is the vector of all 1s, writ-
ten 1.
Since S is symmetric and si ≥ 0, S+ ρ(k)L is positive
semidefinite as well. Choose x ∈ Rn such that xT (S +
ρ(k)L)x = 0. Then xT (S+ ρ(k)L)x = xTSx+ ρ(k)xTLx.
Since S and L are positive semidefinite and ρ(k) > 0, this
implies that xTSx = xTLx = 0.
Since L is symmetric, by the spectral theorem it has
is an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors {b1, . . .bn} with
associated eigenvectors {λ1, . . . λn}. Because L is posi-
tive semidefinite λi ≥ 0, that xTLx =
∑n
i=1 λi(x
Tbi)
2.
And, because xTLx = 0, if λi 6= 0, xTbi = 0.
It follows that x is an eigenvector of L with eigenvalue
0; that is, x = c1 for some constant c, and therefore
xTSx = c2
∑n
i=1 si. Since si ≥ 0 and not all si are zero,
we must have c = 0, so x = 0. Following, S + ρ(k)L is
positive definite, and therefore invertible.
3Define:
Fk(x) =
(
S+ ρ(k)D
)−1 (
Sx+ + ρ(k)Ax
)
and let:
Gk = Fk ◦ Fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ F1 (3)
Then x(k) = Fk(x
(k−1)) and x(k) = Gk(x(0)). That is,
iterating these Fk captures the evolution of x
(k). We
show that for each k, Fk is a contraction and therefore
has a fixed point by the Banach Fixed Point Theorem
[41]. We use this result in the proof of Theorem 8.
Lemma 3. For all k, Fk is a contraction map with fixed
point given by x(k) = (S+ ρ(k)L)−1Sx+.
Proof. Let B be the (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix given by
adding a row and column to ρ(k)(S + ρ(k)D)−1A as fol-
lows:
B =
[
ρ(k)(S+ ρ(k)D)−1A (S+ ρ(k)D)−1S1
0 1
]
The rows of B sum to 1. To see this, replace x+ and
x
(k−1)
i in Eq. (2) with 1. Thus B is a stochastic matrix
for a Markov process with a single absorbing state. Since
G is connected and not all si are equal to 0, a transition
exists from each state to the steady state; thus from any
starting state, convergence to the steady state is guaran-
teed. This means that limi→∞(ρ(k)(S+ρ(k)D)−1A)i = 0,
so A is a convergent matrix. Equivalently, if ‖·‖ denotes
the matrix operator norm, then, ‖ρ(k)(S+ρ(k)D)−1A‖ <
1. Therefore for any x,y ∈ [0, 1]n:
‖Fk(x)− Fk(y)‖ = ‖(S+ ρ(k)D)−1ρ(k)A(x− y)‖
≤ ‖(S+ ρ(k)D)−1ρ(k)A‖‖x− y‖
That is, Fk is a contraction map on a compact set, so
by the Banach fixed-point theorem, it has a unique fixed
point x(k).
Let x(k) be that fixed point. Then x(k) = Fk(x
(k)).
Rearranging the terms yields,
(S+ ρ(k)D)x(k) − ρ(k)Ax(k) = (S+ ρ(k)L)x(k) = Sx+.
Therefore:
x(k) = (S+ ρ(k)L)−1Sx+. (4)
This completes the proof.
The following lemma will allow us to consider the ma-
trices (S+ρ(k)L)−1 for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . } in GLn(R) (the Lie
group of invertible n×n real matrices) as perturbations.
This enables effective approximations of asymptotic be-
haviors.
Lemma 4. Let {b1 . . .bn} an orthonormal basis of
Rn. Also let M : Rn → Rn be an invertible sym-
metric linear transformation (invertible square matrix)
and {u1, . . .un} be a set of unit vectors such that for a
small constant δ, M−1b1 = λb1 +O(δ)u1 and M−1bj =
O(δ)uj for j 6= 1.
Then if ‖v‖ = 1, and s ∈ R, then unless (M +
svvT ) is not invertible, there exists a set of unit
vectors {u′1, . . .u′n} such that (M + svvT )−1b1 =
λ
1+sλ(vTb1)2
b1 +O(δ)u
′
1 and (M+ svv
T )−1bj = O(δ)u′j
for j 6= 1.
Before proceeding to the proof of this result, based
on the Sherman-Morrison formula, we note that we will
establish an instance of the necessary conditions of this
lemma in Theorem 5. Thus the lemma is not vacuous.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since {b1 . . .bn} is an orthonormal
basis, v =
∑n
i=1 aibi where ai = v
Tbi. This means that
M−1v =
∑n
i=1 aiM
−1(bi) = λa1b1 + O(δ)
∑n
i=1 aiui.
By Cauchy-Schwartz, |ai| ≤ ‖v‖‖bi‖ = 1, so by the
triangle inequality, ‖∑ni=1 aiui‖ ≤ n. Then letting
u =
∑n
i=1 aiui
n , we have that M
−1v = λa1b1 + O(δ)u,
where ‖u‖ ≤ 1.
By the Sherman-Morrison formula,
(M+ svvT )−1 = M−1 − sM
−1vvTM−1
1 + svTM−1v
.
Using this, and choosing each u′i to be an appropriate
rescaling of the O(δ) terms yields:
(M+ svvT )−1(b1) = M−1b1 − sM
−1vvTM−1b1
1 + svTM−1v
=
λb1+O(δ)u1− sv
T (λb1 +O(δ)u1)
1 + svT (λa1b1 +O(δ)u)
(λa1b1+O(δ)u)
= λb1 +O(δ)u1 − sλa1 +O(δ)
1 + sλa21 +O(δ)
(λa1b1 +O(δ)u)
=
λ
1 + sλ(vTb1)2
b1 +O(δ)u
′
1
Furthermore, for j 6= 1:
(M+ svvT )−1(bj) = M−1bj − sM
−1vvTM−1bj
1 + svTM−1v
=
O(δ)uj − sv
T (O(δ)u1)
1 + svT (λa1b1 +O(δ)u)
(λa1b1 +O(δ)u)
= O(δ)u′j
This completes the proof.
The results stated give insight into the motion of fixed
points as ρ(k) increases. We now show that the fixed point
given by Eq. (4) converge to the average of the agents’
initial preferences, weighted by the stubbornness of each
agent. We then use that result to prove the dynamics
converge to this point when ρ(k) →∞.
Theorem 5. If limk→∞ ρ(k) =∞, then:
lim
k→∞
x(k) =
∑n
i=1 six
+
i∑n
i=1 si
1.
4Proof. Since G is a graph, the Laplacian L is a posi-
tive semidefinite symmetric matrix, and therefore has an
orthonormal basis of eigenvectors {b1, . . .bn} with real
eigenvalues {λ1, . . . λn}. Since G is connected, only a sin-
gle eigenvalue λ1 = 0 and the associated unit eigenvector
is b1 =
1√
n
1.
Since every vector is an eigenvector of the identity ma-
trix I, {b1, . . .bn} are an orthonormal basis of eigenvec-
tors for I + ρ(k)L with eigenvalues {1, 1 + ρ(k)λ2, . . . 1 +
ρ(k)λn}. But then (I + ρ(k)L)−1 has the same basis of
eigenvectors, with eigenvalues {1, 1
1+ρ(k)λ2
, . . . 1
1+ρ(k)λn
}.
As ρ(k) → ∞, 1
1+ρ(k)λj
→ 0 for each j 6= 1. In partic-
ular, for any δ > 0, for sufficiently large ρ(k), I + ρ(k)L
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4 with λ = 1.
Let I+ρ(k)L = M0. Then, for each l up to n, let Ml =
(Ml−1 + (sl − 1)eleTl ) where el is the lth vector of the
standard basis. Since ele
T
l is the zero matrix with a one
in the lth place on the diagonal,
∑n
l=1(sl−1)eieTi = S−I
and therefore Mn = (I + ρ
(k)L) +
∑n
l=1(sl − 1)eleTl =
S+ ρ(k)L.
By iterating Lemma 4 with s = sl − 1 and v = el, we
have that for each l there is a λl such that M
−1
l b1 =
λlb1 +O(δ)u
(l)
1 and M
−1
l bj = O(δ)u
(l)
j for j 6= 1.
Since eTl b1 =
1√
n
, Lemma 4 gives the recurrence:
λl =
λl−1
1 + λl−1 si−1n
Solving this recurrence with λ0 = 1 yields:
M−1l b1 =
n
n+
∑l
k=1(sk − 1)
b1 +O(δ)u
(l)
1
Since
∑n
k=1(sk − 1) = tr(S)− n, it is clear that
M−1n b1 =
n
tr(S)
b1 +O(δ)u
(n)
1 .
Therefore, for u =
∑n
i=1 b
T
1 Sx
+u
(n)
i :
x(k) =
n
tr(S)
bT1 Sx
+b1 +O(δ)
n∑
i=1
bT1 Sx
+u
(n)
i
=
1TSx+
tr(S)
1+O(δ)u
=
∑n
i=1 six
+
i∑n
i=1 si
1+O(δ)u
Since δ → 0 as ρ(k) →∞, if limk→∞ ρ(k) =∞, then:
lim
k→∞
x(k) =
∑n
i=1 six
+
i∑n
i=1 si
1.
This completes the proof.
Since peer pressure increases in each step, no single Fk
is sufficient to model the process of convergence. We use
the following result from [39, 42]
Lemma 6 (Theorem 1 of [42] & Theorem 2 of [39]).
Let {fn} be a sequence of analytic contractions in a
domain D with fn(D) ⊆ E ⊆ D0 ⊆ D for all n.
Then Fn = fn ◦ fn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 converges uniformly in
D0 and locally uniformly in D to a constant function
F (z) = c ∈ E. Furthermore, the fixed points of fn con-
verge to the constant c.
The following corollary is now immediate from Lem-
mas 3 and 6:
Corollary 7. From Eq. (3), let Gk = Fk ◦ Gk−1 =
Fk ◦Fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦F1 for each k ≥ 0. Then G = limk→∞Gk
is a constant function and (functional) convergence is
uniform.
We now have the following theorem, which follows im-
mediately from Corollary 7 and Theorem 5:
Theorem 8. If ρ(k) →∞, then:
lim
k→∞
x(k) =
∑n
i=1 six
+
i∑n
i=1 si
1.
This means that in the case of increasing and un-
bounded peer pressure, all the agents’ opinions always
converge to consensus. In addition, the value of this con-
sensus is the average of their preferences weighted by
their stubbornness. This is irrespective of the weighting
of the edges in the network, so long as the network is
connected.
We illustrate opinion consensus on a simple graph with
15 vertices in Fig. 1. The vertices are organized into
three connected cliques. Each clique was initialized with
a distinct range of opinions in [0, 1]. Initial stubbornness
was set randomly and is shown by relative vertex size.
The opinion trajectories for this example are shown in
Fig. 2.
In the case of increasing but bounded peer pressure,
we have:
lim
k→∞
ρ(k) ≤ ρ∗
Further, this limit always exists by monotone conver-
gence. Intuitively, this means the influence of others is
limited, and that personal preferences will always slightly
skew the opinions of others. Again, this is consistent with
social influence theories on bounded peer pressure and
trade-offs with comfort level [18, 38].
Theorem 9. Suppose ρ(k) is increasing and bounded and
that:
lim
k→∞
ρ(k) = ρ∗,
then
lim
k→∞
x(k) = (S+ ρ∗L)−1Sx+.
5FIG. 1: The evolution of opinions on a small graph with three
cliques. Color indicates opinion, size resistance to change.
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FIG. 2: The opinion trajectories are shown illustrating (a)
convergences and (b) initial transient behaviors.
Proof. Since ρ(k) is increasing and bounded, it converges
to a finite number ρ∗ by monotone convergence. From
Lemma 2, (S+ ρ∗L) is defined and invertible. Since ma-
trix inversion is continuous in GLn(R), by Theorem 7:
lim
k→∞
x(k) = lim
k→∞
x(k)
= lim
k→∞
(S+ ρ(k)L)−1Sx+
= (S+ lim
k→∞
ρ(k)L)−1Sx+
= (S+ ρ∗L)−1Sx+
The above theorem tells us that if peer pressure is in-
creasing and bounded, the agents’ opinions converge to
a fixed distribution, which may not be a consensus, but
is easily computable from the initial preferences. In this
case, the shape of the network is important for determin-
ing the limit distribution, as the edge weights factor into
the Laplacian. This result is similar to the convergence
point given in [18] where stubbornness coefficients are
not presented and peer pressure is constant.
IV. CONVERGENCE RATE
We analyze the convergence rate of the algorithm and
obtain a secondary result on efficiency. Define the utility
of these convergent points to be the sum of the stress of
the agents when the state x is constant. Formally:
U (k)(x) =
∑
i
Ji(xi,x, k)
=
n∑
i=1
si(xi − x+i )2 + ρk
∑
i,j
wij(xi − xj)2

= (x− x+)TS(x− x+) + 2ρkxTLx
= xT (S+ 2ρkL)x− 2xTSx+ + (x+)TSx+
(5)
Define the limiting utility U(x) as:
U(x) = lim
k→∞
1
ρ(k)
U (k)(x) (6)
The following lemma is immediately clear from the con-
struction of the functions Ji, the fact that U
(k) is a
strictly convex function and U is the limit of these strictly
convex functions:
Lemma 10. The global utility function U(x) is convex.
Furthermore, the fact that (i) U (k) is smooth on its en-
tire domain and (ii) U (k)(x)/ρ(k) converges uniformly
to U(x), implies that U(x) is both differentiable and its
derivative can be computed as the limit of the derivatives
of U (k)(x)/ρ(k).
Using the global utility function, we can analyze the
convergence rate of the update rule. From Eq. (2), we
6can compute:
∆x
(k−1)
i = x
(k)
i − x(k−1)i =
si(x
+
i − x(k−1)i ) +
∑n
j=1
(
x
(k−1)
j − x(k−1)i
)
si + ρ(k)
∑n
j=1 wij
(7)
Let:
α
(k)
i =
1
si + ρ(k)
∑n
j=1 wij
(8)
and define H(k) = 12diag
(
α
(k)
1 , . . . , α
(k)
n
)
. Computing
the gradient of U (k) yields:
∆x = −H(k)∇U (k)
(
x
(k−1)
i
)
(9)
We conclude the update rule, Eq. (2) can be written:
x(k) = x(k−1) −H(k)∇U (k) (xk−1) (10)
Necessarily, H(k) is always positive definite and there-
fore −H(k)∇U (k) (xk−1) is always a descent direction
for U (k). Moreover, (∇Uk)T∇U > 0 and consequently
−H(k)∇U (k) (xk−1) is a descent direction for U(x).
Thus, the update rule is a descent algorithm, which ex-
plains the initial fast convergence toward the average (see
Fig. 2). When the descent direction converges to a New-
ton step, a descent algorithm can be shown to converge
superlinearly [43]. However, these steps do not converge
to Newton steps. As ρ(k) grows large, α
(k)
i → 0 and
Uk/ρ
(k) → U and consequently for large k:
1
ρ(k)
H(k)∇U (k) (xk−1) ≈ ∇U (xk−1)
for  ∼ 1/ρ(k). Thus, the update rule approaches a simple
gradient descent. We show that a consequence of this is
a linear convergence rate.
Let:
x∗ =
∑n
i=1 six
+
i∑n
i=1 si
1
and define:
y(k) = x(k) − x∗.
From Eq. (10) we compute:∥∥x(k+1) − x∗∥∥∥∥x(k) − x∗∥∥ =
∥∥y(k) −H(k+1)∇U (k+1)(x(k))∥∥∥∥y(k−1) −H(k)∇U (k)(x(k−1))∥∥ (11)
Assuming ρ(k) → ∞ as k → ∞, and expanding the gra-
dient using Eq. (5) we obtain:
lim
k→∞
∥∥x(k+1) − x∗∥∥∥∥x(k) − x∗∥∥ = limk→∞
1
ρ(k)
1
ρ(k)
∥∥y(k) −H(k+1) ([S+ 2ρ(k+1)L]x(k) − 2Sx+)∥∥∥∥y(k−1) −H(k) ([S+ 2ρ(k)L]x(k−1) − 2Sx+)∥∥ =
lim
k→∞
∥∥∥y(k)/ρ(k) −H(k+1) ([S/ρ(k) + 2ρ(k+1)ρ(k) L]x(k) − 2Sx+/ρ(k))∥∥∥∥∥y(k−1)/ρ(k) −H(k) ([S/ρ(k) + 2L]x(k−1) − 2Sx+/ρ(k))∥∥ =
lim
k→∞
2ρ
(k+1)
ρ(k)
∥∥H(k+1)Lx(k)∥∥
2
∥∥H(k)Lx(k−1)∥∥ (12)
As ρ(k) →∞, we see that:
H(k) → 1
2ρ(k)
D−1,
where D is the diagonal weighted degree matrix. Then:
lim
k→∞
2ρ
(k+1)
ρ(k)
∥∥H(k+1)Lx(k)∥∥
2
∥∥H(k)Lx(k−1)∥∥ =
ρ(k+1)
ρ(k)
1
ρ(k+1)
∥∥D−1Lx(k)∥∥
1
ρ(k)
∥∥D−1Lx(k−1)∥∥ = 1
Thus we have shown:
Theorem 11. The convergence rate of the update rule
given in Eq. (2) is linear. In particular:
lim
k→∞
∥∥x(k+1) − x∗∥∥∥∥x(k) − x∗∥∥ = 1, (13)
We illustrate the slow convergence on a larger exam-
ple with 500 vertices organized into a scale-free graph
using the Baraba´si-Albert [44] graph construction algo-
rithm. The graph and snapshots of opinion evolution
are shown in Fig. 3. We show the opinion trajecto-
ries for the 500 vertex scale-free network in Fig. 4(a)
and illustrate Eq. (13) in Fig. 4(b). Notice the ratio∥∥x(k+1) − x∗∥∥/∥∥x(k) − x∗∥∥ approaches 1 as expected.
7FIG. 3: A larger example of convergence using a scale-free
graph with 500 vertices generated using the Baraba´si-Albert
algorithm.
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FIG. 4: (a)Opinion convergence is illustrated in a scale free
network. (b) Linear convergence is demonstrated by show-
ing the ratio
∥∥∥x(k+1) − x∗∥∥∥/∥∥∥x(k) − x∗∥∥∥ converges to 1 as ex-
pected.
V. COST OF ANARCHY
[18] observe that simultaneous minimization of Eq. (1)
is a game-theoretic problem and compare the total social
utility in a centralized solution to a decentralized solution
(Nash equilibrium); i.e., they compute a price of anarchy
[18, 45]. To analyze the price of anarchy of this system,
we cannot use the utility function in Eq. (5), as the
U (k)(limk→∞ x(k)) → 0 when ρ(k) → ∞. Instead, we
use a total utility function UT (x) = limk→∞ U (k)(x) to
compute the cost of anarchy:
Theorem 12. The convergent point limk→∞ x(k) mini-
mizes total utility if and only if limk→∞ ρk =∞.
Proof. If ρ(k) converges to a finite number ρ∗, then the
total utility is
UT (x) = x
T (S+ 2ρ∗L)x− 2xTSx+ + (x+)TSx+
Note that this is identical to the work in [18], except with
edge weights multiplied by ρ∗. We note that limk→∞ x(k)
is the Nash Equilibrium used in [18]. From the work in
[18] we may conclude the convergent point is not optimal
for finite ρ∗.
If limk→∞ ρk =∞, then if x 6= c1 for some constant c,
then xTLx > 0, so U (k)(x) grows without bound. How-
ever, for any k, we have that U (k)(c1) =
∑n
i=1 si(c−x+i )2,
so UT (c1) =
∑n
i=1 si(c − x+i )2. By first order necessary
conditions of optimality:∑n
i=1 six
+
i∑n
i=1 si
1
minimizes U(x), and thus limk→∞ x(k) is optimal.
This gives the following trivial corollary, which is con-
sistent with the work in [18].
Corollary 13. The cost of anarchy is 1 if and only if
limk→∞ ρ(k) =∞.
VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The hypothesis of increasing peer pressure in social
settings underlies this work. We attempt to (in)validate
the hypothesis that peer-pressure does increase in real-
world systems, by using data from the well-known Social
Evolution Experiment [46]. The experiment tracked the
everyday life of approximately 80 students in an under-
graduate dormitory over 6 months using mobile phones
and surveys, in order to mine spatio-temporal behavioral
patterns and the co-evolution of individual behaviors and
social network structure.
The dataset includes proximity, location, and call logs,
collected through a mobile application. Also included are
sociometric survey data for relationships, political opin-
ions, recent smoking behavior, attitudes towards exercise
8and fitness, attitudes towards diet, attitudes towards aca-
demic performance, current confidence and anxiety level,
and musical tastes.
The derived social network graph (shown Fig. 5) repre-
sents each student as a node; an edge is present between
two nodes if either student noted any level of interaction
during the surveys. Edge weights were derived based on
the level of interaction recorded between the students in
the surveys, as well as the number of surveys in which
the interaction appeared. We note that this graph is not
(a)Graph Layout
(b)Degree Distribution
FIG. 5: Social network of the political data set showing a
high-degree of social connectedness.
scale-free, as is typical of social networks. This may be a
result of the size of the network, collection bias or simply
representative of this social network. As a consequence,
it is dense.
Political opinion was modeled on a [0, 1] scale, with
lower numbers representing Republican preferences and
higher numbers representing Democratic preferences. In-
dividual scores were assigned based on reported political
party, preferred candidate and likelihood of voting (prior
to the election), as well as who they voted for and their
approval rating of Barack Obama (after the election).
Appendix A contains the code used to set these prefer-
ences. Each month’s survey was examined individually
to put together a monthly time line of each person’s po-
litical views. The results of the first survey were used
as proxy for their inherent personal preference, prior to
peer influence.
Finally, individual stubbornness/lack of susceptibility
to peer pressure was approximated using reported inter-
est in politics on the first survey administered, as well
as stated likelihood of voting. These survey questions
were independent of those used in determining political
preferences. Appendix B contains the code used to set
stubbornness.
Given a list of ρ(k), students’ preferences were simu-
lated by aligning each iteration of play to one day in the
survey period. The simulated preferences were compared
to the surveyed preferences at each month, and the dis-
tances between the vectors were summed to get a single
score for each list of ρ(k).
This function of ρ(k) was minimized with fminsearch in
Matlab and the best-fit peer pressure values were found
to be increasing, with a best fit line ρ(k) = 1.06∗k−11.96
and r2 = .9886 (see Fig. 6). The inferred increasing in
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FIG. 6: Fit of estimated peer pressure showing a clear increase
over time, validating the primary hypothesis of the paper that
individual consensus occurs because peer pressure increases
on each round.
peer pressure is consistent with the underlying hypothesis
of the paper, under the assumption that the process of
repeated opinion averaging with stubbornness is a valid
model of human behavior. We discuss this further in
Section VII.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we study an opinion formation model
under the presence of increasing peer pressure. As in
earlier work, we consider agents whose opinion is af-
fected by unchanging innate beliefs. In this paper, the
relative strength of these innate beliefs may vary from
agent to agent. We show that in the case of unbounded
peer-pressure, opinion consensus to a weighted average
of innate beliefs is ensured. We also consider the case
9when peer-pressure is increasing, but bounded. Simula-
tion suggests a numerically slow convergence, which is
explained by showing the system dynamics converge to
gradient descent applied to a certain convex function.
Using this observation we show that that convergence is
linear. We evaluate our hypothesis that peer-pressure in-
creases in real world closed systems by fitting our model
to a live data set.
We note that that the assumption of a non-constant
(and increasing) peer-pressure coefficient can help miti-
gate the fast initial convergence of this class of models.
It is rare in the real-world to see dramatic opinion shifts
over extremely short time scales. Such dramatic shifts
are consistent with a gradient descent. However, by vary-
ing peer-pressure, the gradient descent can be controlled,
leading to more consistency with real-world phenomena
as illustrated.
In future work, the limitation that the network is undi-
rected and symmetric should be removed to account for
asymmetric social influence. In addition, the network
is assumed to remain static during the convergence pro-
cess, with connections independent of the agents’ opin-
ions. Sufficiently different opinions could cause enough
stress between agents so as to cause them to reduce in-
fluence or even sever the tie between them. A dynamic
network model as in [47] could accommodate this kind
of network update. Finally, it would be interesting to
study corresponding control problems, in which we are
given a x¯, the desired convergence point and we can con-
trol a subset of agents reporting values (x
(k)
i ), stubborn-
ness (si) or initial value (x
+
i ) to determine conditions
under which opinion steering is possible. This problem
becomes more interesting if the other agents attempt to
determine whether certain agents are intentionally at-
tempting to manipulate the opinion value x(k). Of equal
interest is the transient control problem in which x(k) is
steered through a set X ⊂ Rn under the assumption that
external factors will prevent convergence in the long-run.
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Appendix A: Initial Condition Code
The Matlab code below sets the initial preferences (x+)
in this experiment.
%Get the months in which the surveys were taken
dates = unique ( Po l i t i ca lTab l e . su rvey month ) ;
%Set each person ' s i n t i t i a l p o l i t i c a l l e an ing s to exac t ly cente r
%This i s what we assume i f no other in format ion i s c o l l e c t e d .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s = ones (NumActors , s i z e ( dates , 1 ) ) / 2 ;
f o r j = 1 : s i z e ( dates , 1 )
%import the p o l i t i c a l part o f the surveys
I = ze ro s ( s i z e ( Po l i t i c a lTab l e , 1 ) , 1 ) ;
f o r i = 1 : s i z e ( Po l i t i c a lTab l e , 1 )
I ( i ) = strcmp ( Po l i t i ca lTab l e . su rvey month ( i ) , dates ( j ) ) ;
end
TempTable = Po l i t i c a lTab l e ( I ==1 ,:);
% For each person , i f they say they are l i b e r a l
% or conservat ive , add or subtrac t . 1
% an add i t i ona l .05 i f they say ' extremely '
% and .05 l e s s i f they say ' s l i g h t l y '
f o r i = 1 : s i z e (TempTable , 1 )
i f strcmp ( TempTab l e . l i b e ra l o r cons e rva t i v e ( i ) , . . .
'Extremely l i b e r a l ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = .65 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e . l i b e ra l o r cons e rva t i v e ( i ) , . . .
' L ibe ra l ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = .6 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e . l i b e ra l o r cons e rva t i v e ( i ) , . . .
' S l i g h t l y l i b e r a l ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = .55 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e . l i b e ra l o r cons e rva t i v e ( i ) , . . .
'Extremely conse rva t i v e ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = .35 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e . l i b e ra l o r cons e rva t i v e ( i ) , . . .
' Conservat ive ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = .4 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e . l i b e ra l o r cons e rva t i v e ( i ) , . . .
' S l i g h t l y conse rva t i v e ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = .45 ;
end
%Based on th e i r party membership , add or subtract . 1
i f strcmp ( TempTable .pre ferred party ( i ) , 'Democrat ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .1 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable .pre ferred party ( i ) , 'Republican ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 1 ;
end
% Add or subtract . 1 i f they add th e i r party in
% the d e t a i l s part , with .05 adjustment f o r s t rong
% or not s t r ong . Indpendent and
%other s were not accounted f o r
i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .p r e f e r r ed par ty de ta i l s ( i ) , . . .
' Strong Democrat ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .15 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .p r e f e r r ed par ty de ta i l s ( i ) , . . .
'Democratic Party ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .1 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .p r e f e r r ed par ty de ta i l s ( i ) , . . .
'Not very strong Democrat ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .05 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .p r e f e r r ed par ty de ta i l s ( i ) , . . .
'Not very strong Republican ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 05 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .p r e f e r r ed par ty de ta i l s ( i ) , . . .
'Republican Party ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 1 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .p r e f e r r ed par ty de ta i l s ( i ) , . . .
' Strong Republican ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 15 ;
end
% Add or subtract . 2 i f the person voted
% ( or would have voted ) f o r one o f the major
% party candidates
i f strcmp ( TempTab l e .d id vote in e l e c t i on ( i ) , . . .
' I voted in t h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n ' )
i f strcmp ( TempTable .voted pre ferred candidate ( i ) , . . .
' John McCain ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 2 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable .voted pre ferred candidate ( i ) , . . .
'Barack Obama ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .2 ;
end
e l s e
i f strcmp ( TempTable .not voted pre fe r red candidate ( i ) , . . .
' John McCain ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 2 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( . . .
TempTable .not voted pre fe r red candidate ( i ) , . . .
'Barack Obama ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .2 ;
end
end
%When vot ing in the e l e c t i on , add or
% subtract .05 f o r the party that they
% vote for , with and extra . 1 i f they
% are sure
i f strcmp ( TempTable .vot ing for today ( i ) , . . .
' De f i n i t e l y Barack Obama ' )
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I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .15 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable .vot ing for today ( i ) , . . .
'Probably Barack Obama ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .05 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable .vot ing for today ( i ) , . . .
'Probably John McCain ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 05 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable .vot ing for today ( i ) , . . .
' De f i n i t e l y John McCain ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 15 ;
end
%After the e l e c t i o n add or subtract . 3
% i f they approve or diapprove o f Obama as
% pres ident , with a . 1 adjustment f o r
% strong or s l i g h t
i f strcmp ( TempTable.approve obama president ( i ) , . . .
' Strongly Approve ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .4 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable.approve obama president ( i ) , . . .
' S l i g h t l y Approve ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) + .2 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable.approve obama president ( i ) , . . .
' S l i g h t l y Disapprove ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 2 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( TempTable.approve obama president ( i ) , . . .
' Strongly Disapprove ' )
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) = . . .
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( TempTable.user id ( i ) , j ) - . 4 ;
end
end
end
% Fina l ly , r e s t r i c t the p r e f e r en c e s to within
% [ 0 , 1 ] by taking any higher and s e t t i n g to 1 ,
% and any lower and s e t t i n g to 0
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s > 1) = 1 ;
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s < 0) = 0 ;
%Re s t r i c t to usable surveys
I n f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s = In f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( : , [ 1 : 3 , 5 : 7 ] ) ;
%And se t i n i t i a l p r e f e r en c e s based on these i n f e r e n c e s .
I n i t i a l P r e f e r e n c e s = In f e r r e dP r e f e r en c e s ( : , 1 ) ;
Appendix B: Stubbornness Setting Code
The Matlab code below set the stubbornness coeffi-
cients (s) in this experiment.
%Set a l l i n i t i a l stubbornness va lues to 0
s = ze ro s (NumActors , 1 ) ;
% Get the r e l vant survey data
I = ze ro s ( s i z e ( Po l i t i c a lTab l e , 1 ) , 1 ) ;
f o r i = 1 : s i z e ( Po l i t i c a lTab l e , 1 )
I ( i ) = strcmp ( Po l i t i ca lTab l e . su rvey month ( i ) , . . .
' 2008 .09 ' ) ;
end
I n i t i a lTab l e = Po l i t i c a lTab l e ( I ==1 ,:);
%For each user
f o r i = 1 : s i z e ( I n i t i a lTab l e , 1 )
% se t t h e i r stubbornness va lues h igher i f
% they ex t r e s s g r ea t e r i n t e r e s t in p o l i t i c s .
i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . i n t e r e s t e d i n p o l i t i c s ( i ) , . . .
'Very i n t e r e s t e d ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = 6 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . i n t e r e s t e d i n p o l i t i c s ( i ) , . . .
'Somewhat i n t e r e s t e d ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = 4 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . i n t e r e s t e d i n p o l i t i c s ( i ) , . . .
' S l i g h t l y i n t e r e s t e d ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = 2 ;
end
%Adjust i f they say they are more l i k e l y
% to vote ( s e t to 0 i f they wont.
i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . l i k e l i h o o d o f v o t i n g ( i ) , . . .
' I w i l l d e f i n i t e l y vote ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) + 3 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . l i k e l i h o o d o f v o t i n g ( i ) , . . .
' I w i l l most l i k e l y vote ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) + 1 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . l i k e l i h o o d o f v o t i n g ( i ) , . . .
' I w i l l most l i k e l y not vote ' ) &&. . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) - 1 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . l i k e l i h o o d o f v o t i n g ( i ) , . . .
' I w i l l d e f i n i t e l y not vote ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = 0 ;
end
% and a l i t t l e h igher i f they expres s i n t e r e s t
% in a party , r e g a r d l e s s o f the par ty .
i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . p r e f e r r e d p a r t y d e t a i l s ( i ) , . . .
' Strong Democrat ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) + .15 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . p r e f e r r e d p a r t y d e t a i l s ( i ) , . . .
'Democratic Party ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) + .05 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . p r e f e r r e d p a r t y d e t a i l s ( i ) , . . .
'Republican Party ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) + .05 ;
e l s e i f strcmp ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . p r e f e r r e d p a r t y d e t a i l s ( i ) , . . .
' Strong Republican ' )
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) = . . .
s ( I n i t i a l T a b l e . u s e r i d ( i ) ) + .15 ;
end
end
%I n i t i a l i z e the matrix
s = s∗StubbornnessConstant ;
S = diag ( s ) ;
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